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Abstract—In this paper, a novel method for proﬁling phishing
activity from an analysis of phishing emails is proposed. Proﬁling
is useful in determining the activity of an individual or a
particular group of phishers. Work in the area of phishing is
usually aimed at detection of phishing emails. In this paper, we
concentrate on proﬁling as distinct from detection of phishing
emails. We formulate the proﬁling problem as a multi-label
classiﬁcation problem using the hyperlinks in the phishing emails
as features and structural properties of emails along with whois
(i.e.DNS) information on hyperlinks as proﬁle classes. Further,
we generate proﬁles based on classiﬁer predictions. Thus, classes
become elements of proﬁles. We employ a boosting algorithm
(AdaBoost) as well as SVM to generate multi-label class pre-
dictions on three different datasets created from hyperlink
information in phishing emails. These predictions are further
utilized to generate complete proﬁles of these emails. Results
show that proﬁling can be done with quite high accuracy using
hyperlink information.
I. INTRODUCTION
‘Phishing’ can be deﬁned as a scam by which an email
user is duped into surrendering private information that will
be used for identity theft. Phishing attacks use both social
engineering and technical subterfuge to steal personal identity
data and ﬁnancial account credentials. It is one of the fastest
growing scams on the Internet. The exclusive motivation
of phishers is ﬁnancial gain. Phishers employ a variety of
different techniques from spoofed links to malware (keylog-
gers) to DNS Cache Poisoning [1] (which is also known
as ‘Pharming’) to lure the unsuspected user into divulging
their personal information [2]. Spoofed emails would contain
phishing deception methods like hidden addresses that are
spoofed like http://www.commbank.com.au.stpr.ru/ instead of
the original address as http://www.commbank.com.au/. They
also exploit different vulnerabilities in the browser like hiding
the address of the actual site in the status bar. Also malicious
software redirects users to spoofed sites.
Usually, a spoofed email is sent to a large group of people
from an address that appears to be from their bank or some
other legitimate institution. The email is typically worded to
instill a sense of urgency and to elicit an immediate response
from the recipient. For example, ‘verify your account details
or your account will be closed’. The hoax email also contains
a link to an online form that is branded to look exactly
like the organization’s website. The form has to be ﬁlled
in using sensitive information like passwords, user account
details, credit card details. Until recently most phishers used
the names of ﬁnancial institutions to deceive people into giving
away their account information. They now use the names of
other organizations like eBay and Apple.
There have been many approaches to detect and prevent
phishing attacks like anti-phishing toolbars, and scam website
blockers [3], [4], [5]. Further machine learning approaches
have also been devised for this purpose [6], [3]. Also another
approach to develop an architecture for detecting phishing
is proposed in [7], [8]. For example, the eBay Toolbar is a
browser plugin that eBay offers to its customers, primarily to
help them keep track of auction sites. The toolbar has a feature
called ‘Account Guard’ that monitors the domain names that
users visit and provide warning in the form of a coloured tab
on the toolbar. The tab is usually grey but it turns green if the
user is on eBay or a PayPal site. It turns red if the user is on a
site that is detected as spoofed by eBay. Similarly spoofguard
is a Internet Explorer browser plugin that warns users when
webpages have a high probability of being spoofed.
The phishing problem has been and still is very important,
and the detection and warning approach taken to the problem is
not enough. The existing literature mainly deals with phishing
detection problems. The main problem addressed in the litera-
ture is the detection of phishing emails based on some signiﬁ-
cant features that they possess. In this work a different aspect
of phishing is investigated, namely the proﬁling of phishing
emails. Phishers usually follow a variety of techniques, so a
proﬁle can be expected to show a conglomeration of different
activities. Proﬁles can be understood as metadata on phishers,
in particular, information on activities of a related individual
or a group involved in the activity. Proﬁles can be ascertained
to provide information on different phishers involved in the
activity. By generating proﬁles, phishing activities can be
better understood as well as monitored. In this paper we
describe an approach based on representing a proﬁle as a set of
labels (classes) identiﬁed in the phishing emails that align with
characteristics useful for proﬁling. Multi-label classiﬁcation is
used on the links within the emails to predict a set of labels
that form a part proﬁle of the phishing activity.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides an
introduction to phishing and some background on the literature
surrounding the problem. Section 2 focuses on proﬁling.
Sections 3 and 4 describe our formulation of the problem and
the data sets that are used and generated to form a basis for
this approach. Section 5 presents the classiﬁcation algorithms
used and the evaluation measures.Sections 6 and 7 present the
results.
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II. PROFILING
‘Proﬁling is a data surveillance technique which is little
understood and ill-documented, but increasingly used. It in-
volves generating suspects or prospects from within a large
population, and inferring a set of characteristics of a particular
class of person from past experience’ [9]. In [9], different
data surveillance techniques such as front-end veriﬁcation and
data matching have been surveyed. It has been found that
proﬁling data requires different sets of measures and there
are different problems that need to be tackled in this area.
We take the deﬁnition of proﬁling as in [9]: ‘Proﬁling is
a technique whereby a set of characteristics of a particular
class of person is inferred from past experience, and data-
holdings are then searched for individuals for close ﬁt to
that set of characteristics.’ Furthermore numerous potential
areas for the use of proﬁling have been identiﬁed as well,
such as patients who have a likelihood of suffering from
certain diseases or disorders, students having potential artistic
talents and many others. However the potential use of proﬁling
has been to identify customers buying patterns and market
products accordingly.
Certainly proﬁling has been in vogue, particularly in ar-
eas like ‘Market Basket Analysis’ [10], [11] that proﬁles
customers based on their buying patterns which can further
be used by companies to ascertain the nature of competitive
markets. Also there have been studies in ‘Investor Proﬁling’
[12], [13], wherein an individual’s investment decisions are
taken into accoiunt and used to underline the policies and
marketing strategies of investment companies. More recently
‘Offender Proﬁling’[14], [15] in Forensic Psychology [16] is
used to identify perpetrator(s) of a crime, based on nature of
the offence committed and its mode of operation [17], [18].
This leads to determination of various aspects of criminal
psychology before, during and after the crime is committed.
Further ‘Customer Proﬁling’ which deals with gathering
non-sensitive data about customers (like age, buying patterns
and others) is a very important tool in customer relationship
management (CRM) activities of companies as can be found
in the survey in [19]. Furthermore as is mentioned in the
above survey ‘the more information on customers, the better
equipped an organization will be to cater to the needs of their
customers’.
In this paper, we follow the same trend set up by these
studies, to proﬁle phishing emails based on the structural
characteristics of the emails received by persons and the
information derived on hyperlinks from ‘Whois Database’[20].
Since different domain names from different countries were
present in the hyperlinks, whois information had to be gener-
ated after querying different whois databases, such as the Asia
Paciﬁc Network Information Centre (APNIC) and the Rseaux
IP Europens Network Coordination Centre (RIPE NCC) [21],
[22]. In our work on understanding phishing activity from a
social engineering and social networking point of view we are
interested in categorizing the activities of phishing groups and
devising techniques for automatically obtaining parts of the
group proﬁle.
III. THE PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this paper, we use data mining to help proﬁle phishing
emails. Usually a phisher contacts a victim through emails;
hence we take the most signiﬁcant part of the email - the
hyperlink information as features. For our experiments, we
develop three different datasets from hyperlink information for
generating proﬁles. We use characteristics like the structure of
the emails sent by the phishers to their potential victims (which
we call structural information) and metadata on the hyperlinks
- the whois information. We consider these characteristics
as classes that will correspond to labels in a multi-label
classiﬁcation problem.
Utilizing a data classiﬁcation technique will provide the
relationships between the hyperlinks in the phishing emails
and their pre-speciﬁed categories/classes. Further we can use
the multi-label classiﬁer to assign unknown emails to their
categories or classes and therefore to particular attrubutes in
their proﬁles. Familiarity with the data provides conﬁrmation
that most examples would provide multiple labels that would
be informative in terms of proﬁling.
The approach suggested considers:
• Accessing features from the emails that are simple and
effective.
• The particular characteristics of the emails that can be
considered as attributes in proﬁles.
Our view is that proﬁles should be able to distinguish between
different groups. For example, an email may have the follow-
ing characteristics, it has, a table, an image and so on. Another
group may have different subsets of these characteristics.
Phishers have different modus operandi or ways of working.
In one case, phishers have different ways of handling phishing
activity. Some phishers may embed scripts and images in the
form which can safely pass detectors and when clicked by
the user takes them to a site that is not the original one. In
other instances, another group might insert a fake link in the
form and when clicked will take the user to a phishing site.
Hence the modus operandi is different for different groups.
Based on this fact, we would want to identify groups using
the different forms of structures embedded inside emails. If
we deﬁne the feature set as consisting of these characteristics
then data clustering would provide different groups having
similar proﬁles. This problem that has been considered in
[23]. Preliminary analysis shows that there are many difﬁcult
problems in clustering. Different algorithms give different
cluster results. In this paper we follow a different approach.
We choose these characteristics as classes and try to predict a
set of classes or labels of new emails. The feature set used in
this case, is essentially the hyperlink information from emails.
IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DATA
Based on two different types of information (that can be
readily obtained), classes were selected for generating proﬁles.
They are: (1) Structural Properties of the emails sent to vic-
tims, which present salient characters of the emails (2) Whois
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properties of the hyperlinks, which gives detailed information
about a domain hosted on the internet.
The structural properties that could be used as classes are:
(a) textcontent - binary value specifying if the email
had a text part or was solely an html email. It
has been observed that most phishing emails have
multiparts attached to them such as text and html
parts. This would be ‘1’ if the email had a text part
and ‘0’ otherwise.
(b) vlinks - speciﬁcation of the number of visible
links in the email. The value for this class is ‘1’
if the number of visible links is greater than zero
and ‘0’ otherwise. Visible links are mainly used in a
phishing email as a disguise for the actual hyperlink.
(c) htmlcontent - binary value specifying if the email
had a html part or was solely a text email. This would
be ‘1’ if the email had html part, ‘0’ otherwise In
case of both parts being present in the email, both
textcontent and htmlcontent would have the value of
unity.
(d) script - binary value specifying if the email
has an embedded script. ‘1’ if email had scripts,
‘0’ otherwise. It has been noted that scripts are an
important part of phishing emails as they are usually
not picked up by the anti-phishing toolbars. Scripts
can perform myriad of activities - like opening hoax
site in another window or storing the username and
password. Presence of certain scripts might be a good
way to generate a proﬁle.
(e) table - determines the number of tables in the
email. Value for this class is ‘1’ if the number of
tables is greater than zero,‘0’ otherwise. Tables are
useful in proﬁle generation as the data in each row
of the table can be made to form a hyperlink to some
hoax sites. Hence presence of the tables can be used
in proﬁle generation.
(f) image/logos - determines embedded images in the
email. Value for this class is ‘1’ if the number of
images are greater than zero,‘0’ otherwise. Images
are an useful tool for proﬁle generation since some
emails sent by phishers come in multipart format
containing image and text part. Images in particular
act as hidden link in transfering the unsuspected user
to a phishing site. Hence the presence of images in
an email can be used in proﬁling.
(g) hyperlinks - determines the number of hyperlinks
in the email. Value for this class is ‘1’ if the number
of hyperlinks is greater than zero,‘0’ otherwise. As
was discussed earlier, presence of hyperlinks are an
important part of an email and phishers take great
care in hiding these links.
(h) formtag - binary value, ‘1’ if the email had a
form embedded, ‘0’ otherwise. Presence of forms
in an email would probably open up a data entry
window and ask the user to enter their information.
On submission, the data would be transferred to the
hoax site that is set as the action. Hence this is useful
for proﬁling.
(i) faketags - number of faketags in the email. Value
for this class is ‘1’ if the number of faketags are
greater than zero, ‘0’ otherwise. The faketags are
important because they are thrown into the emails
to confuse the phishing email detector.
From these structural properties, the email characteristics sent
by an individual or a group of phishers can be identiﬁed. We
use these structural classes for generating the proﬁles in all
the above-mentioned datasets.
Another set of classes are generated from the whois prop-
erties of the hyperlinks themselves. Since the hyperlinks are
from different countries and were hosted on different domains,
information from a number of whois databases were used
to generate the classes mentioned here. In recent work [3]
for detecting phishing emails, the authors had also used
‘whois’ information to select appropriate features for their
learning algorithm. In our case we use whois information
as classes. Based on the available information retrieved from
the databases the whois classes were assigned manually. It
was realized that three different types of whois classes could
be determined from the information found on the embedded
hyperlinks. The classes that were generated are as:
(a) Hacked Site - if a legitimate site was hacked and
used to send emails to customers then the value of
this would be ‘1’, ‘0’ otherwise.
(b) Hosted Site - if a site was hosted on a server and
was used to send emails and receive responses then
the value of this would be ’1’, ‘0’ otherwise.
(c) Legitimate Site Addition - This denotes a hosted
site with addition to a legitimate domain. If a site
was hosted on a server and its name was just an
extension to a legimitate domain address, then this
value would be ‘1’, ‘0’ otherwise.
Whois classes are of great signiﬁcance since they help us
to proﬁle the activity of the phishers, whether an individual
host their own site or hack a site or host a site very similar to
the original, just an addition to it. Particularly the latter could
be hosted in different domains and on different servers. Hence
identiﬁcation of these classes are crucial to proﬁling phishing
emails.
We select combination of different characteristics as classes
to generate the different datasets. The aim being to identify
the prominent characteristics that can be used for effective
identiﬁcation of emails. The choice of these classes is based
on the rarer characteristics that are prominent in emails but are
not so prominent as to be present in most emails. We describe
the selection of these classes in Section IV-D.
A. Information on data
The phishing emails in this paper are 2048 emails which
are obtained from a major Australian Bank. These are emails
gathered by their information security group and have been
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identiﬁed/ detected as phishing emails. Most emails have been
collected over a span of 5 months. Most of the emails are of
1026 characters in length and have text as well as hyperlink
content embedded in them. Some of them contain html struc-
tures like script, tables, images and other structures that can be
useful in identifying the structures of the emails and hence the
modus operandi of the phishing group or activity. In this paper,
we create different datasets from hyperlink information in
phishing emails. We utilize 2048 emails which were previously
detected as phishing emails. While extracting hyperlinks some
emails that did not have any hyperlink information were
removed. The ﬁnal set of documents containing hyperlinks
were ascertained to be 2038. The datasets generated are listed
hereunder. In all these datasets the classes deﬁned are from
structural characteristics of emails and from whois information
as described in Section IV-D.
B. Generation of datasets
Hyperlink Based (L)
In this dataset, a complete hyperlink present in an email is
taken as a feature. Hyperlinks specify links to a resource
usually on the web. In a phishing email a hyperlink is
usually kept hidden from the user. To generate datasets these
hyperlinks were extracted from the emails. Hyperlinks can
usually be found as values of href attribute of an anchor
< a > tag within an email. Emails can have one or more than
one feature based on whether one or multiple hyperlinks are
present. Hyperlink extraction in phishing emails is particularly
more troublesome, because of the presence of spurious tags
(similar to the anchor tag) like < acf > to confuse the parsers.
Phishers do this to ensure that their hidden links are not picked
up by the anti-phishing toolbars and the like. Also junk text
deliberately included in the emails makes it more difﬁcult to
determine the content. From this dataset we aim to ﬁnd out
whether extracting an unseen hyperlink can provide useful
information on the proﬁle of the phisher.
Hyperlink Suspected Component Based (Lsus)
In this dataset, the extracted hyperlink is broken down and
only the ‘suspected part’ is taken. By ‘suspected part’ we
mean that part of the hyperlink which contains information
about the directory structure of the link. Usually, a phisher
lures an unsuspecting victim to a site which is usually
located at a convenient location within a personal directory
created by the phisher. So this directory holds all the related
ﬁles that phishers use to achieve the objective of fetching
sensitive information from victims. Hence, a link from any
hosted server to this particular directory can be regarded
as suspected link, wherein the suspected part is the link to
this directory. Moreover, it has been observed, that in some
hyperlinks although the hosted server remains the same, the
directory structure changes as victims from different ﬁnancial
institutions are attacked. Hence, we call this particular
dataset Hyperlink Suspected Component Based taking into
consideration these facts. An example of suspected part in a
hyperlink would be phishing/html/index2.ﬁles assuming that
the given hyperlink is
http://www.domainname.com/phishing/html/index2.ﬁles. Our
aim in generating this dataset is to identify whether the
unseen directory structure of a hyperlink, can provide proﬁle
information.
Hyperlink Template Based (Ltemp)
An extracted hyperlink is broken down further into its
template format in this dataset. By ‘template format’ the
constituent parts of the hyperlink is meant. In this dataset
we break a hyperlink down into its constituent elements. For
example, given a hyperlink:
http://www.domainname.com/phishing/html/index2.ﬁles, the
template format would be www.domainname.com, phishing,
html, index2.ﬁles. Hence an email in this dataset would
usually have multiple features. In generating this dataset, the
aim is to study if given an unseen template can we predict a
proﬁle.
The idea behind generating these datasets is that phishers
employ different varieties of email links to hide their
destination link from the victim. Essentially, these datasets
are designed to pick up these different formats. Another point
worth mentioning here is that we would also be interested in
observing how these three proﬁles generated correspond to
each other.
C. Choice of hyperlinks as features
A hyperlink in an html page signiﬁes a link to a resource on
the web that can be loaded in the browser when some event
occurs - for example, mouse click on the hyperlink. Phishers
usually utilize this technique to transfer an unsuspecting
user to a hoax site. Usually emails are the modus operandi
of phishers trying to contact their potential victims. Emails
would not have been as useful for phishing activity if
hyperlinks could not be embedded in them. Hence, to a
phisher, an embedded hyperlink in an email is the most
important feature. Certainly, a lot of care is taken to disguise
an embedded link in various ways, for example an email
might consist of a link embedded in a picture that the user
sees on opening the email. Accidentally clicking on this
picture would send the user to a phishing site. There are also
other techniques of making the embedded link invisible to
the user by not letting it appear in the status bar. Since this
is such an important feature to a phisher, we take hyperlinks
as features for generating proﬁles.
D. Selection of Classes
When generating proﬁles we need to use those charac-
teristics that would be best at distinguishing between the
different phishing groups. For this reason, we will consider the
occurrence frequencies of the characterisitcs considered above.
We have, out of all structural characteristics the following
frequencies: From Table I, it can be seen that some classes
have very high frequencies, hence these classes are not taken
into account as they are likely to be poor discriminators
between the emails. From these classes, we further generate
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TABLE I
CLASSES AND THEIR FREQUENCIES
Structural Classes Frequency
vlinks 2037
htmlcontent 1962
link 1938
image 1080
table 868
faketags 645
textcontent 529
script 79
form 48
Whois Classes Frequency
Hosted Site 1252
Legitimate Site Addition 807
Hacked Site 146
two different sets of classes for classiﬁcation purposes as
mentioned below. In all these cases we remove the most
frequently occurring classes from the list of classes.
Class Set 1 - Remove maximum frequency
classes:
(There are 9 classes in this case)
link, image, table, faketags,
textcontent, script, form,
Hosted_Site, Legitimate_Site_Addition,
Hacked_Site
Class Set 2: Remove maximum frequency
classes and whois classes:
(There are 6 classes in this case)
link, image, table, faketags,
textcontent, script, form
Class Set 3: Only Whois classes:
(There are 3 classes in this case)
Hosted_Site, Legitimate_Site_Addition,
Hacked_Site
We are left with multiple classes and our idea of treating
the problem of generating a proﬁle as a multi-label classiﬁ-
cation problem is based on these classes as labels which will
constitute elements of the proﬁle.
V. CLASSIFICATION ALGORITHMS AND EVALUATION
MEASURES USED
A. Algorithms
In the experiments, we use two different algorithms. Boos-
Texter, proposed in [24], is a well-known classiﬁcation algo-
rithm developed for multi-label classiﬁcation problems. It is
based on boosting concept in machine learning [25]. Boosting
increases classiﬁer accuracy by combining rules generated at
each round by a weak learning algorithm. BoosTexter uses
two algorithms to solve multi-label classiﬁcation problems,
namely AdaBoost.MH and AdaBoost.MR [24]. It generates
more accurate classiﬁcation rules after sequentially calling
the weak learner in a series of rounds. In our experiments,
we run BoosTexter for 300 rounds. Another classiﬁcation
algorithm that we use to generate proﬁles is SVM light - an
implementation version of Support Vector Machines [26].
B. Evaluation Measures
To determine classiﬁer accuracy for multi-label
classiﬁcation, we use the following measures for performance
analysis. These measures proposed in [24] are specially
designed for multi-label classiﬁcation problems. They are
namely, One-Error, Coverage and Average Precision. We use
the modiﬁed versions of these measures given below.
Let X be the set of all documents. The classiﬁca-
tion algorithm generates a prediction vector H(x) =
(H1(x), · · · ,Hc(x)) where c is the number of classes for each
document x ∈ X . The maximal value of Hi(x), i = 1 · · · c
indicates that the document x is more likely to belong to class
i. In the following, the notation |S| represents the cardinality
of the set S.
1) One-Error:
This measure evaluates how many times a ‘maximal’
class predicted has not occured in expert vector for the
class. Let, as before, H(x) = (H1(x), · · · ,Hc(x)) be
a set of prediction classes, where c is the number of
classes. In cases, where there are more than one class,
having the same maximal weight in the predicted vector,
this measure needs to be deﬁned. Consider H∗(x) =
{i ∈ {1, · · · , c} : Hi(x) = max{H1(x) · · ·Hc(x)}, and
Y∗(x) = {i ∈ 1, · · · , c} : i ∈ H∗(x) and Yi(x) = 1 }.
Then one-error is deﬁned as:
Eone−error =
1
|X |
∑
x∈X
(1− |Y
∗(x)|
|H∗(x)| ) (1)
2) Coverage :
This measure evaluates the performance of a classiﬁer
for all classes that have been observed. Given x ∈ X , let
Γ(x) be the set of all ordered classes τ = {i1, · · · , ic} ⊂
1, · · · .c statisfying Hi1(x) ≥ · · · ≥ Hic(x). Then
according to the class vector (Y1(x), · · · ,Yc(x)), the
rank and error is deﬁned as:
rankτ (x) = max{n : Yi(x) = 1,
n = 1, · · · , c}; (2)
errorτ (x) =
rankτ (x)
||Y(x)|| − 1 (3)
Obviously the terms rankτ and errorτ depend on the
order of τ . One way to avoid the dependence on ordering
is to take the middle value of maximal and minimal
ranks. In this work, this value is used as the measure.
This can be deﬁned as:
rank(x) =
1
2
(rankmax(x) + rankmin(x)); (4)
where
rankmax(x) = maxτ∈Γ(x)rankΓ(x)
rankmin(x) = minτ∈Γ(x)rankΓ(x)
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The numbers rankmax(x) and rankmin(x) are asso-
ciated to the worst and best ordering respectively. To
deﬁne coverage the following formula will be used.
Ecov = =
1
|X |
∑
x∈X
(
rank(x)
||Y(x)|| − 1
)
(5)
It must be noted that Ecov = 0 if a classiﬁer makes
predictions such that for all x ∈ X , the observed
reactions are placed on the top of the ordering list of
weights Hi(x).
3) Average Precision :
Let Y (x) = {l ∈ {1, . . . , c} : Yl(x) = 1} be the set
of classes that have been observed for an example x
and H(x) = {H1(x), · · · ,Hc(x)} be predicted classes
calculated. T (x) denotes the set of all ordered classes
τ = {i1, . . . , ic} satisfying the condition
Hi1(x) ≥ . . . ≥ Hic(x);
where ik ∈ {1, . . . , c} and ik = im if k = m. In the
case, when the numbers Hi(x), i = 1, · · · , c, are
different, there is just one order satisfying this condition.
But if there are classes having the same weights then
predicted classes can be ordered in different ways; that
is, in this case the set T (x) contains more than one
order. Given order τ = {τ1, . . . , τc} ∈ T (x), the rank
for each class l ∈ Y (x) as rankτ (x; l) = k, where the
number k satisﬁes τk = l. Then Precision is deﬁned
as:
Pτ (x) =
1
|Y (x)|×
∑
l∈Y (x)
|{k ∈ Y (x) : rankτ (x; k) ≤ rankτ (x; l)}|
rankτ (x; l)
.
This measure has the following meaning. For instance,
if all observed classes Y (x) have occurred on the top of
ordering τ then Pτ (x) = 1. Clearly the number Pτ (x)
depends on the order τ. This is deﬁned as
Pbest(x) = max
τ∈T (x)
Pτ (x)
and
Pworst(x) = min
τ∈T (x)
Pτ (x)
which are related to the ‘best’ and ‘worst’ ordering.
Therefore, it is sensible to deﬁne the Precision as the
midpoint of these two versions: P (x) = (Pbest(x) +
Pworst(x))/2. Average Precision over all records X
will be deﬁned as:
Pav =
1
|X |
∑
x∈X
P (x). (6)
For all experiments conducted in this work, the above-
mentioned measures are used as the performance measures
for the determination of classiﬁer accuracy. From the above,
it can be seen that Average Precision is more suitable for
multi-label evaluation problems.
VI. CLASSIFICATION RESULTS
In generating predictions from BoosTexter described in
Section V, we use a bag-of-words approach in which hyper-
links from emails are the features and structural and whois
information are the classes. Hence, we would have an input
feature vector and an input class vector being provided to
the algorithm to generate a prediction vector. To evaluate the
classiﬁer’s accuracy we perform four-fold cross-validation on
all the datsets mentioned in Section IV-B. Further we evaluate
classiﬁer performance using the performance measures de-
scribed in Section V. BoosTexter achieves quite high accuracy
on these datasets which means that the proﬁles generated by
BoosTexter are quite accurate. Results of One-Error, Coverage
and Average Precision from Boostexter are presented in Table
II. The results are averaged over four folds. Further results
from SVM using the linear kernel have been presented .
TABLE II
Boostexter RESULTS ON THE TEST SET OF DIFFERENT PHISHING
HYPERLINK BASED DATASETS. NDOCS DENOTES THE NUMBER OF
DOCUMENTS PRESENT IN THE DATASET. One-Error, Coverage AND Average
Precision IS DENOTED BY ONE-ERR, COV AND AVG-PR RESPECTIVELY.
DatasetName nDocs One-Err Cov Avg-Pr
L 2038 0.001 0.05 99.05
Lsus 1805 0.001 0.043 99.16
Ltemp 2038 0.001 0.03 99.30
TABLE III
SVM LINEAR KERNEL RESULTS ON THE TEST SET OF DIFFERENT PHISHING
HYPERLINK BASED DATASETS. NDOCS DENOTES THE NUMBER OF
DOCUMENTS PRESENT IN THE DATASET. One-Error, Coverage AND Average
Precision IS DENOTED BY ONE-ERR, COV AND AVG-PR RESPECTIVELY.
DatasetName nDocs One-Err Cov Avg-Pr
L 2038 0.012 0.096 98.56
Lsus 1805 0.085 0.122 95.49
Ltemp 2038 0.009 0.079 96.23
Hence for these types of datasets boosting algorithms can be
a suitable choice for generating proﬁles. The above results also
show that, Average Precision is higher on Hyperlink Template
Based dataset which could be expected, since breaking a
hyperlink into separate parts will generate more features for
the algorithm to learn. The important fact is that accuracy on
the test set also increases. Furthermore, number of examples
in the Hyperlink Suspected Component Based dataset is less
than the others, since not all hyperlinks do have a link to the
directory structure.
VII. PROFILE GENERATION RESULTS
To generate proﬁles, the results generated by the classiﬁer
are used. BoosTexter generates predictions in which
the most related class has the highest weight and the
least related class have the least weight. Following the
notation mentioned in Section V, a prediction vector
generated by the classiﬁcation algorithm is given by
H(x) = (H1(x), · · · ,Hc(x)) where c is the number of
classes for each document x ∈ X ; X being the set of all
125
documents. In the prediction vector, Hi(x) > 0, (i = 1, · · · , c)
will mean that the example belongs to class i. Further,
Hj(x) > Hi(x) > 0, (i = 1, · · · , c), (j = 1, · · · , c), (i = j)
will mean that the example is more related to class j than
to class i. Futher, classes that do not correspond to this
particular example have negative weights.
Our method of proﬁle generation from predictions constitute
the following steps:
Step 1:Choose all the positive coordinates in H(x), that is,
all Hi(x) > 0, (i = 1, · · · , c).
Step 2:Arrange them in a descending order.
Step 3:Generate complete proﬁle involving the classes re-
lated to these positive coordinates.
We present below some results from proﬁle generation
experiments. In Proﬁle 1, we present an example on
Hyperlink Based (L) dataset. Similar proﬁles can be
generated from Hyperlink Suspected Component Based
(Lsus) and Hyperlink Template Based (Ltemp) datasets.
Weights for different classes as generated by the classiﬁer are
also presented. Moreover, we also provide our interprerations
of this proﬁle.
Profile 1: An Example of Profiling
on Hyperlink Based Dataset
Example ID: 1146556342.16183_1
Features (Hyperlink):
http://www3.netbank.commbank.
common-site.net/netbank/bankmain/
Classes (structure and whois):
textcontent=0, vlinks=1, htmlcontent=1,
script=0, table=0, image=0, hyperlink=1,
form=0, faketags=0, Hosted_Site=1,
Legitimate_Site_Addition=1
Profile Generated:
vlinks(0.030) htmlcontent(0.018)
hyperlink(0.016) Hosted_Site(0.014)
Legitimate_Site_Addition(0.012)
In the above proﬁle, the hyperlink present in an email is
taken as the feature. The classes supplied are the structural
classes of the emails as well as the whois classes. The proﬁle
is generated as prediction from the algorithm. Proﬁle 1 shows
us that the presence of hyperlink
http://www3.netbank.commbank.common-site.net/
netbank/bankmain/,
the directory structure
netbank/bankmain/
or template
www3.netbank.commbank.common-site.net,
netbank, bankmain
has a correlation with the presence of visible links in emails.
The visible links are used to disguise hyperlinks, which
might exist as a hidden link within the html ﬁle. This is also
shown by the positive value of ‘hyperlink’ class. Further,
the email is directed to html compliant browsers, since only
‘htmlcontent’ is present. Moreover, hosting of the site is
on a different domain and is superimposed on a legitimate
site http://www3.netbank. commbank.com as is evident
from ‘Hosted Site’ and ‘Legitimate Site Addition’ classes.
Further, presence of ‘vlinks’ that is visible links in the email
has the highest weight which means that the hosted site has a
link that is a spoofed link that is usually linked to another site.
Moreover, using weights generated by the classifer, it can
be said that ‘vlinks’ and ‘htmlcontent’ are the most important
classes enhancing the fact that this hyperlink correlates with
presence of visible links in emails (for a disguise) and with
html based emails only. Further, classes like ‘Hosted Site’
and ‘Legitimate Site Addition’ having similar weights in
most datasets bears evidence to the fact that the phishing site
is a hosted site and to fool the user it is generated as being an
addition to a legitimate site. Further some speciﬁc details can
also be derived. It can be seen from Proﬁle 1 above, that this
directory structure within a hosted server can be regarded as
suspected one since the phisher uses items from this directory
for phishing operation. It is also possible that ﬁles in this
directory take the user to another location, but safely this can
be regarded as the primary destination. There is no presence
of other structures in the email for retrieving information
like forms or scripts. The phisher(s) rely on tranferring the
unsuspected user to the hoax site and extract information.
To summarize, the above results it can be stated that an
email containing the hyperlink:
http://www3.netbank.commbank.common-site.net/
netbank/bankmain/
is a phsihing email which has its site hosted on a domain that
is an addition to a legitimate domain to fool an unsuspected
user into thinking that it is from the legitimate domain. Further,
the directory structure within the hosted server would be of
netbank/bankmain/
type. This directory structure will further try to convince
the unsuspected user into thinking that it is deﬁnitely the
legitimate site. The phishers who hosted this site targets html-
compliant browsers. They do not seem to be have pages for
text-based browsers. Their mode of operation is not using
scripting or entry of details into an embedded form within
the email but to lure the unsuspected victim to a fake site
using the hyperlink. Thus, more knowledge is obtained from
a hyperlink by using different datasets and by summarizing all
proﬁles obtained.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a novel method for obtain-
ing proﬁles from phishing emails using hyperlink information
as features and structural and whois information as classes. We
have transformed the problem of proﬁling into a multilabel
classiﬁcation problem in which proﬁles are generated based
on the predictions of the classiﬁer. We have used a well-
known classiﬁcation algorithm (BoosTexter and SVM) for
our experiments. Further, we create three different datasets
from the hyperlink information in emails and use four-fold
cross-validation to generate our predictions. The results from
BoosTexter provided very high classiﬁcation accuracy, hence
more accurate proﬁling was obtained. We have also provided
prediction weights generated by the classiﬁer that show the
relative importance of the classes used in proﬁle generation.
In future, we would enhance this technique to bring in more
prominent features and develop more representative classes
for proﬁling. Also we would like to experiment with different
classiﬁers and compare the proﬁles generated in the process.
Further, we aim to achieve a valid criterion for measuring the
importance of the classes present in proﬁling.
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